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CASENOTE
PRICE WA TERHOUSE v. HOPKINS:
BALANCING EMPLOYEES' RIGHTS AND
EMPLOYERS' PREROGATIVES:
ALLOCATION OF THE BURDENS
OF PROOF IN A TITLE VII
MIXED-MOTIVE CASE
In August of 1982, Ann Hopkins, a senior manager in the Washington
D.C. office of Price Waterhouse,' was nominated for partnership in the
firm. 2  As part of its formal partnership admissions process, Price
Waterhouse invited all partners in the firm to submit written evaluations on
each proposed candidate and to recommend whether the candidate should
be admitted to partnership, rejected, or placed on hold for possible reconsid-
eration at a later time. The comments submitted to the Admissions Com-
mittee included complaints about Hopkins' lack of interpersonal skills and
her abrasiveness in dealing with her staff.3 These perceived shortcomings in
Hopkins' professional skills ultimately prompted the Admissions Committee
to recommend that the Policy Board place her candidacy for partnership on
hold. 4
1. Price Waterhouse is a nationwide professional accounting firm that specializes in pro-
viding auditing, tax, and management consulting services primarily to corporations and gov-
ernment agencies. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458, 461 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
2. Each year partners are selected from the firm's senior managers through a process of
nomination, review, and election by all partners in the firm. In support of Hopkins' nomina-
tion, the partners in the Washington D.C. office submitted a highly complimentary appraisal of
Hopkins, praising her outstanding performance and strongly urging her admission to partner-
ship. The district court found that Hopkins had played a substantial role in securing a multi-
million dollar contract with the State Department and that "[n]one of the other partnership
candidates at Price Waterhouse that year had a comparable record in terms of successfully
securing major contracts for the partnership." Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp.
1109, 1112 (D.D.C 1985). Price Waterhouse conceded from the beginning that Hopkins met
the qualifications to be considered for partnership. Id. at 1113.
3. The district court found that both "[s]upporters and opponents of her candidacy indi-
cated that [Hopkins] was sometimes overly aggressive, unduly harsh, difficult to work with and
impatient with staff." Id.
4. Thirteen of the thirty-two partners who submitted comments on Hopkins supported
her candidacy, eight recommended that her candidacy be rejected, three recommended placing
it on hold, and eight indicated they lacked sufficient information to form an opinion. Id. Hop-
kins was the only woman among eighty-eight senior managers nominated for partnership that
year. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1781, 104 L. Ed. 2d 268, 277 (1989).
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Several of the comments submitted by the partners, however, referred to
Hopkins in gender-based terms. The comments characterized her as macho,
masculine, and in need of a course at charm school.5 In addition, the part-
ner responsible for explaining the Policy Board's decision advised her that to
improve her chances for partnership she needed "to walk more femininely,
talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair
styled, and wear jewelry."' 6 In January of 1984 Hopkins resigned from Price
Waterhouse7 and brought suit under Title V11 8 of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, alleging that the Policy Board's decision to place her candidacy on
hold amounted to unlawful sex discrimination. 9
The district court found that although Price Waterhouse had legitimately
considered interpersonal skills in its partnership selection process, the firm
had done nothing to disavow its reliance on the partners' stereotyped com-
ments about Hopkins.' 0 Consequently, the district court found that Price
Waterhouse had unlawfully discriminated against Hopkins on the basis of
sex." The district court also held, however, that Price Waterhouse could
avoid the imposition of equitable relief by proving by clear and convincing
evidence that the Policy Board would have decided to place her candidacy
on hold even if discrimination had played no part in the decision. 12 Price
Waterhouse failed to meet this burden.' 3 The court of appeals affirmed the
district court's holding that once a plaintiff proves that gender played a sub-
stantial role in the employment decision, the burden shifts to the employer to
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the decision would have been
the same in the absence of discrimination. 14 The court of appeals held that if
the employer meets this burden, however, he may avoid liability entirely. 1'
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. Held, reversed and re-
manded: When a plaintiff proves that sex played a motivating part in an
employment decision, the defendant may avoid liability only if it proves by a
preponderance of the evidence that the decision would have been the same
5. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d at 463.
6. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. at 1117.
7. Hopkins' office decided against reconsidering her for partnership the following year
after two of its partners withdrew their support. The court of appeals found that this refusal
amounted to constructive discharge, an issue not appealed to the Supreme Court. Price
Waterhouse, 825 F.2d at 473.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988).
9. The Supreme Court in Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 77 (1984), held that
Title VII requires an employer to consider an associate for partnership without regard to sex.
Title VII does not, however, prevent an employer from considering subjective criteria such as
interpersonal skills, particularly in upper level positions. Bartholet, Application of Title VII to
Jobs in High Places, 95 HARv. L. REV. 945, 973-78 (1982).
10. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. at 1120.
11. Id. The district court, however, refused to award relief to Hopkins because it failed to
find that she was constructively discharged. Id. at 1121. The D.C. Circuit reversed the district
court on this point. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d at 473; see supra note 7 and accompanying
text.
12. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. at 1120.
13. Id.
14. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d at 471.
15. Id. at 472.
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even if no discrimination had taken place. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109
S. Ct. 1775, 104 L. Ed. 2d 269 (1989).
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE BURDENS OF PROOF UNDER TITLE VII
A. Legislative Background
The passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 marked the culmination of
years of struggle to eliminate racial inequality in the United States.' 6 The
Act was designed to eliminate discrimination and to integrate excluded mi-
norities into the "mainstream of American society." 1 7 The legislative his-
tory of Title VII indicates that Congress realized that without equal
employment opportunities, the other provisions of the Act would never be-
come a reality. 8 Consequently, Congress designed Title VII to guarantee
equal employment opportunities 19 and to discourage discrimination in the
workplace20 by prohibiting employment decisions based on race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin.2 1
16. In addition to Title VII, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 includes provisions prohibiting
racial discrimination in voting (Title I) 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988), public accommodations (Title
II) 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1988), public schools (Title III) 42 U.S.C. § 2000c (1988) and federally
funded programs (Title VI) 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988). For a general discussion of the legisla-
tive history of Title VII and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see Brodin, The Standard of Causa-
tion in the Mixed-Motive Title VIIAction: A Social Policy Perspective, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 292,
294-99 (1982).
17. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 202 (1979).
18. During the legislative debate on the passage of Title VII, Senator Humphrey stated:
Fair treatment in employment is as important as any other area of civil rights.
What good does it do a Negro to be able to eat in a fine restaurant if he cannot
afford to pay the bill? . . . How can a Negro child be motivated to take full
advantage of integrated educational facilities if he has no hope of getting a job
where he can use that education?
110 CONG. REC. S6547 (daily ed. March 30, 1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey). See also
Weber, 443 U.S. at 202-04 (goal of Act to reverse trend of discriminatory treatment of black
workers in American society); Note, Developments in the Law.- Employment Discrimination
and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1113 (1971) (primary
motive in enacting Title VII was to improve social and economic well-being of black citizens).
19. Equal employment opportunity means that employers may not base employment deci-
sions on any of the forbidden factors listed in Title VII, but it does not require that preferential
treatment be given to members of a protected group. McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S.
792, 800-01 (1973). The McDonnell Douglas Court stated:
Congress did not intend by Title VII .. .to guarantee a job to every person
regardless of qualifications. In short, the Act [Title VII] does not command that
any person be hired simply because he was formerly the subject of discrimina-
tion, or because he is a member of a minority group. Discriminatory preference
for any group, minority or majority, is precisely and only what Congress has
proscribed. What is required by Congress is the removal of artificial, arbitrary,
and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously
to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classification.
Id. (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971)).
20. Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975) (primary objective of
Title VII was to '"provideo the spur or catalyst which causes employers and unions to self-
examine and to self-evaluate their employment practices and to endeavor to eliminate, so far as
possible, the last vestiges of an unfortunate and ignominious page in this country's history' ")
(quoting United States v. N.L. Indust., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 379 (8h Cir. 1973)).
21. Section 2000e-2 of Title VII provides in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer -
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise to dis-
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B. The Single-Motive Cases
Since the enactment of Title VII, the United States Supreme Court has
defined two separate types of employment discrimination claims, disparate
impact2 2 and disparate treatment.2 3 The Court has also allocated the bur-
dens of proof for each of the two types of claims.24 In McDonnell Douglas v.
Green 25 the Supreme Court enunciated the disparate treatment theory of
discrimination under Title VII.26 The Court announced a three-step
formula for allocating the burden of proof in this type of case: (1) the em-
ployee must establish a prima facie case of discrimination;2 7 (2) the em-
criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employ-
ment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988).
22. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-32 (1971). In Griggs the Supreme
Court, in its first major Title VII case, established the disparate impact theory of discrimina-
tion. The Court held that Title VII prohibits an employment practice that, although neutral
on its face, has a disproportionately adverse impact on a protected group and cannot be justi-
fied as a business necessity or as related to job performance. Id. In Griggs the Court implied
that a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of discrimination by demonstrating that the
employer's practices cause a statistically disparate impact on a protected group. Id. The bur-
den of proof then shifts to the defendant to show that the practice is justified as a business
necessity or related to the performance of the job in question. Id; but see Wards Cove Packing
Co. v. Antonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2126, 104 L. Ed. 2d 733, 753 (1989) (employer must only
produce evidence of business justification, which need not be "essential" or "indispensable" to
the employer's business).
23. Disparate treatment occurs when an employer "simply treats some people less favora-
bly than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." International Bd.
of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n. 15 (1977). Proof of the employer's discrimi-
natory motive is required, but may be inferred through differences in treatment. Id. ("un-
doubtedly disparate treatment was the most obvious evil Congress had in mind when it
enacted Title VII"); see also B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
LAW, 15 (1976) ("discrimination is making differences and distinctions" in a form that is
"constitutionally or statutorily forbidden").
24. The phrase "burden of proof" includes several different concepts. The burden of
pleading refers to the burden on a party to raise an issue in the first place. J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2486 (Chadbourn Rev. 1981) [J. WIGMORE]. If
neither party raises an issue, the party with the burden of pleading obviously loses on the issue
not raised. The burden of production refers to the burden on a party to come forward with
enough evidence to support a finding in his favor. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCE-
DURE § 7.6 (3d ed. 1985). Finally, the burden of persuasion refers to the degree to which a
party must persuade the trier of fact that a particular fact is more likely true than not. Id.
§ 7.7. In the typical civil case, the preponderance of the evidence standard governs the degree
to which a party with the burden of proof must persuade the trier of fact. See Mendez, Pre-
sumptions of Discriminatory Motive in Title VII Disparate Treatment Cases, 32 STAN L. REV.
1129, 1129 n.3 (1980). Unless otherwise indicated, this Note uses burden of proof to mean
burden of persuasion.
25. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
26. Id. at 792.
27. Id. at 802. The Court held that the plaintiff may establish a prima facie case by show-
ing that (i) "he belongs to a racial minority"; (ii) "he applied and was qualified for a job for
which the employer was seeking applicants"; (iii) "despite his qualification, he was rejected";
and (iv) "after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek
applicants [sic] from persons [with the] complainant's qualifications." Id. See also Furnco
1152 [Vol. 43
ployer must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
employee's rejection to rebut the prima facie case;28 and (3) the employee
must then have an opportunity to prove that the employer's reason
amounted to a pretext to conceal actual discrimination. 29
In subsequent cases, however, the lower courts confused the Supreme
Court's language regarding the nature of the defendant's burden in step two
of the McDonnell Douglas formula. Some courts required that the defendant
merely state an explanation for its action, 30 while other courts required that
the defendant prove its reason by a preponderance of the evidence. 31 The
Supreme Court resolved this confusion in Texas Department of Community
Affairs v. Burdine 32 by holding that if the plaintiff establishes a prima facie
case of discrimination, the burden that shifts to the defendant merely re-
quires the production of evidence showing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for its actions.3 3 Although the defendant's explanation must be rea-
sonably specific 34 and involve the introduction of legally sufficient, admissi-
ble evidence, 35 the defendant does not have the burden of persuading the
court that it had been "actually motivated by the proffered reason." '36 The
Court held that "the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the
defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all
times with the plaintiff."'37 McDonnell Douglas arguably favored plaintiffs
by allowing them to raise an inference of discrimination through circumstan-
tial evidence which, if not rebutted, resulted in a verdict in their favor. In
Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579-80 (1978) (prima facie case raises inference of
discrimination only because these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not
based on consideration of impermissible factors).
28. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
29. Id. at 802-04.
30. See, e.g., Barnes v. St. Catherine's Hosp., 563 F.2d 324, 329 (7th Cir. 1977) (defendant
met burden by introducing competent evidence to show nondiscriminatory motive); Rich v.
Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 333, 348 (10th Cir. 1975) (defendant may rebut prima facie
discrimination case by producing evidence of objective business reasons or necessity for its
actions); Harper v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 525 F.2d 409, 411 (8th Cir. 1975) (if plaintiff
proves discrimination, burden shifts to defendant "to present acceptable and legitimate busi-
ness reasons" for its actions).
31. See Sweeney v. Board of Trustees of Keene State College, 569 F.2d 169, 177 (1st Cir.
1978) (defendant must prove that nondiscriminatory reason accounts for employment deci-
sion), vacated, 439 U.S. 24 (1978); Turner v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 555 F.2d 1251, 1255 (5th
Cir. 1977) (employer bears burden of proving nondiscriminatory motives by preponderance of
the evidence).
32. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
33. Id. at 254-55. The Court held that:
The burden that shifts to the defendant, therefore, is to rebut the presumption of
discrimination by producing evidence that the plaintiff was rejected, or someone
else was preferred, for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. The defendant
need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the proffered rea-
sons. It is sufficient if the defendant's evidence raises a genuine issue of fact as to
whether it discriminated against the plaintiff.
Id. (citation omitted).
34. Id. at 258.
35. Id. at 255.
36. Id. at 254.
37. Id. at 253. See generally J. WIGMORE, supra note 24, § 2489 (burden of persuasion
"never shifts" to defendant).
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contrast, Burdine clearly favored defendants by allowing them to rebut a
plaintiff's prima facie case merely by stating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason, which need not have actually motivated them.38
C. The Mixed-Motive Cases
The Supreme Court predicated the evidentiary formula developed in the
McDonnell Douglas and Burdine decisions on the premise that the employer
based his employment decision either on a legitimate or an illegitimate rea-
son, but not both. 39 The relatively light burden imposed on defendants to
articulate a legitimate reason for their actions resulted from judicial reluc-
tance to find an employer liable under Title VII on the basis of an inferential
or circumstantial showing of discrimination. 4° Where, however, the plaintiff
presents direct evidence of a discriminatory motive and the defendant
presents a second, nondiscriminatory justification, a case involving mixed
motives arises.4 '
Mixed-motive discrimination cases have arisen previously outside of the
Title VII context. In Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v.
Doyle,42 a suit brought under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, the
Court devised a two-step approach to determine whether the employee was
the victim of an unlawful employment decision resulting from mixed mo-
tives. First, the plaintiff must show that his conduct was constitutionally
protected and that this conduct was a substantial factor or a motivating fac-
tor for the decision. 43 Second, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove by
a preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the same deci-
38. Commentators have expressed the view that few employers today would fail to find
some legitimate reason to justify their actions. See Note, Title VII Mixed-Motive Cases.- The
Eighth Circuit Adds a Second Track of Liability and Remedy, 36 DRAKE L. REV. 155, 160-61
n.25 (1986-87) ("it is highly improbable that any defendant-employer would ever appear in
court without being able to articulate a lawful basis for its action or decision"). Professor
Brodin states:
"[P]lausible justification [for adverse personnel action] can frequently be ad-
vanced whether or not it actually played any part in the formulation of the
decision under contest," .... employers "who receive adequate legal advice and
know how to create a personnel file . . . will find rare the occasions on which
they are found liable."
Brodin, supra note 16, at 321 (citations omitted).
39. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1788-89, 104 L.Ed.2d 268, 285-86
(1989).
40. Id. at 1801, 104 L. Ed.2d at 300-01 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
41. A mixed-motive case has been generally defined as one in which an employer's action
results from two or more reasons, one of which is unlawful. See Note, Clearing the Mixed-
Motive Smokescreen: An Approach to Disparate Treatment Under Title VII, 87 MICH. L. REV.
863, 863-64 n.7 (1989).
42. 429 U.S. 274 (1987). In Mt. Healthy a public school teacher was discharged following
several incidents of unprofessional conduct, including the use of obscene gestures to students
and the notification of a radio station about a school memorandum regarding a faculty dress
code. The teacher sued on the ground that the discharge violated his constitutionally pro-
tected right of free speech. The Court noted that if the school board discharged the teacher
based solely on his exercise of his right of free speech, the discharge would be unlawful. Id. at
283-84. The Court found, however, that the school board had sufficient reason not to extend
tenure independent of any First Amendment rights. Id. at 285-86.
43. Id. at. 287 (footnote omitted).
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sion regardless of the protected conduct." If the defendant meets this bur-
den, he may avoid liability.45
The same decision test enunciated in Mt. Healthy reflects the Court's at-
tempt to attain results consistent with its view of the policies underlying
Title VII and other statutorily protected conduct, that is, to impose a sanc-
tion on an employer who has engaged in wrongdoing without providing a
windfall of relief to the victimized plaintiff.46 The Court had applied this
analysis to other mixed-motive discrimination cases47 but had yet to do so in
mixed-motive cases arising under Title VII. Consequently, the lower courts
adopted divergent standards for allocating the burdens of proof in Title VII
mixed-motive cases. 48
Some circuits followed the Mt. Healthy standard in Title VII cases and
held that once the plaintiff had shown that a discriminatory motive was a
substantial or motivating factor in an employment decision, the burden of
proof shifted to the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that the same decision would have resulted in the absence of discrimina-
tion.49 The D.C. circuit adopted the motivating factor standard but required
the employer to meet the same decision test by clear and convincing evi-
dence.50 Other circuits distinguished between the liability and the remedy
phases of the Title VII case and, after a finding of liability, allowed the de-
fendant to prove that the same decision would have occurred only for the
purpose of determining the appropriate remedy. 51 Finally, the remaining
circuits applied a but for standard of causation and required a plaintiff to
prove that but for an illegitimate motive, the employment decision would
44. Id.
45. Id. at 285-86.
46. Id. at 286. Justice Rehnquist expressed the fear that without this two-step test, an
employee who engaged in constitutionally protected conduct may be given greater protection
than an employee who did not:
A borderline or marginal candidate should not have the employment question
resolved against him because of constitutionally protected conduct. But that
same candidate ought not to be able, by engaging in such conduct, to prevent his
employer from assessing his performance record and reaching a decision not to
rehire on the basis of that record ....
Id.
47. See, e.g., Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 232 (1985) (applying Mt. Healthy stan-
dard in case invalidating section of state constitution disenfranchising certain persons con-
victed of crimes when purpose of statute was racial discrimination); NLRB v. Transportation
Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 403 (1983) (applying Mt. Healthy standard to mixed-motive
labor practice case under National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158 (a) (1),(3) (1988));
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270 n.21 (1977)
(applying Mt. Healthy standard in racially motivated municipal rezoning case).
48. See cases cited infra notes 49-51, 52.
49. See Berl v. County of Westchester, 849 F.2d 712, 714 (2d Cir. 1988); Fields v. Clark
Univ., 817 F.2d 931, 937 (1st Cir. 1987); Miles v. M.N.C. Corp., 750 F.2d 867, 875-76 (1lth
Cir. 1985); Blalock v. Metals Trades, Inc., 775 F.2d 703, 712 (6th Cir. 1985); Bell v. Birming-
ham Linen Serv., 715 F.2d 1552, 1557 (11th Cir. 1983).
50. See Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458, 471 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Toney v.
Block, 705 F.2d 1364, 1366 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
51. See Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318, 1324 (8th Cir. 1985); Fadhl v. City and County of
San Francisco, 741 F.2d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir. 1984); accord Nanty v. Barrows Co., 660 F.2d
1327, 1333 (9th Cir. 1981).
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have favored the plaintiff.5 2 These conflicting lines of authority following
the Burdine and Mt. Healthy decisions set the stage for Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins.
II. PRICE WATERHOUSE V. HOPKINS
A. Plurality Opinion
In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins5 3 the Supreme Court clarified the alloca-
tion of the burdens of proof and reaffirmed the rationale of Mt. Healthy and
its progeny as applied to mixed-motive cases under Title VII.54 The plural-
ity opinion, written by Justice Brennan, recognized the dual nature of Title
VII, which balances employee rights and employer prerogatives, as decisive
in allocating the burdens of proof.55 The plurality concluded that when the
plaintiff demonstrates that an employer has actually relied on an impermissi-
ble motive in making an employment decision, the burden of persuasion ap-
propriately shifts to the defendant to show that a legitimate motive, standing
alone, would have induced it to make the same decision. 56
The Court began its analysis by emphasizing that although Title VII elim-
inates certain bases for distinguishing among employees, the statute pre-
serves an employer's freedom to decide the other qualities it will consider in
making employment decisions. 57 The Court then reasoned that the prohibi-
tion against an employment decision made because of a person's sex is not
limited to situations in which discrimination is shown to be the but for cause
of the decision. 58 Title VII also prohibits an employment decision in which
an employer relied on sex as simply one factor in the decision. 59 To give
effect to second aim of Title VII, the preservation of the employer's remain-
ing freedom of choice, the Court concluded that an employer incurs no Title
VII liability if it can prove that it would have reached the same decision in
the absence of discrimination. 60 To support its position, the Court empha-
sized its earlier efforts to strike the same balance between employee rights
and employer prerogatives6 1 by recognizing the defenses of business neces-
sity in disparate impact cases and legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons in
disparate treatment cases. 62
52. See Peters v. City of Shreveport, 818 F.2d 1148, 1161 (5th Cir. 1987); McQuillen v.
Wisconsin Educ. Ass'n Council, 830 F.2d 659, 664 (7th Cir. 1987); Ross v. Communications
Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 366 (4th Cir. 1985); Bellissimo v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. 764
F.2d 175, 180 (3d Cir. 1985).
53. 109 S. Ct. 1775, 104 L. Ed. 2d 268 (1989).
54. Id. at 1789-90, 104 L. Ed. 2d at 287.
55. Id. at 1784-85, 104 L. Ed. 2d at 280-81.
56. Id. at 1789-92, 104 L. Ed. 2d at 287-89.
57. Id. at 1784-85, 104 L. Ed. 2d at 280-81.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1786, 104 L. Ed. 2d at 282-83.
61. Id.
62. Id. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990 (1988) (disparate
impact case recognizing business necessity defense); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Bur-
dine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981) (disparate treatment case recognizing legitimate, non-discrimi-
natory reason defense); McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (disparate
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The Court distinguished Burdine, in which it had held that the burden of
persuasion did not shift to the employer to prove that its stated explanation
was the true reason for its action.63 The Court reasoned that in a situation
in which the decision resulted from a mixture of both legitimate and illegiti-
mate motives, the Burdine framework was inapplicable because it attempted
to determine whether the decision derived from a single motive. 64 Since the
plaintiff retained the burden to prove that discrimination played a part in a
mixed-motive decision, the Court concluded that the employer's burden to
prove that it would have taken the same action if no discrimination had
occurred constituted an affirmative defense to a Title VII claim.6 5 The
Court then noted that its analysis coincided with its prior decisions in Mt.
Healthy and other mixed-motive cases.66
The Court next addressed the type and degree of proof required of the
plaintiff and the defendant. First, the plaintiff must show that the employer
actually relied on sex in making its decision. 67 Stereotyped remarks,
although not dispositive on the sex discrimination issue, can constitute evi-
dence of an impermissible motive. 68 Second, the Court stated that the em-
ployer, in most cases, can present objective evidence of its probable decision
in the absence of discrimination. 69 Third, the employer cannot prevail sim-
treatment case recognizing legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason defense); Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (disparate impact case recognizing business necessity
defense).
63. Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1788-89, 104 L. Ed. 2d at 285-86.
64. Id. at 1790, 104 L. Ed. 2d at 287.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1789-90, 104 L. Ed. 2d at 286-87 (citing Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222,
228 (1985); Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 417 (1979); Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Corp., 429 U.S. 270-71 n.21 (1977)). The Court also relied on
its reasoning in NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 403 (1983) (em-
ployer is wrongdoer and should bear risk that influence of legal and illegal motives cannot be
separated).
67. Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1791, 104 L. Ed. 2d at 288. Justice Brennan found that
Hopkins had met this burden and noted: "An employer who objects to aggressiveness in wo-
men but whose positions require this trait places women in an intolerable and impermissible
Catch-22: out of job if they behave aggressively and out of a job if they don't. Title VII lifts
women out of this bind." Id.
68. Id. The Supreme Court previously addressed the issue of sex stereotyping functioning
as sex discrimination in City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S.
702, 707-11 (1978). In that case an employer justified larger pension fund contributions by
female employees on the basis of the "unquestionably true" generalization that women live
longer than men. Id. at 707. In addressing this issue, the Court quoted a Seventh Circuit case
stating:
In forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because of their sex,
Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men
and women resulting from sex stereotypes. Section 703(a)(1) [of Title VII] sub-
jects to scrutiny and eliminates such irrational impediments to job opportunities
and enjoyment which have plagued women in the past.
Id. at 707 n.13 (quoting Sprogis v. United Van Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir.
1971).
69. Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1791, 104 L. Ed. 2d at 289. Presumably, Title VII
requires the employer to document in writing all performance appraisals and personnel actions
to support the employment decision at the time it was made. See Cohen, Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins: Mixed Motive Discrimination Cases, the Shifting Burden of Proof and Sexual Stere-
otyping, 40 LAB. L.J. 723, 726 (1989).
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ply by showing that a legitimate motive played a part in the decision. In-
stead, the Court declared that the employer must demonstrate that its
legitimate reason alone would have caused it to make the same decision.70
Finally, the Court noted that conventional rules of civil litigation apply in
Title VII cases.7' The defendant, therefore, may prove its case by a prepon-
derance of the evidence rather than by the clear and convincing standard
required by the lower court's ruling.72 Consequently, the Court reversed the
court of appeals and remanded the case for a determination of whether Price
Waterhouse had met this burden. 73
B. White's Concurrence
Justice White concurred separately in the judgement, but his analysis dif-
fered from the plurality's approach in two respects. First, White would re-
quire the employee to show that sex was a substantial rather than merely a
motivating factor in the employment decision. 74 Second, he criticized the
plurality's requirement that the employer must meet its burden by objective
evidence. 75 White reasoned that credible testimony by the employer as to
what its decision would have been can constitute adequate proof of a legiti-
mate motive for taking the action.
76
C. O'Connor's Concurrence
Justice O'Connor also concurred separately but considered the burden
shifting test adopted by the plurality a supplement to the McDonnell Doug-
las-Burdine analysis for use in cases like Price Waterhouse in which the em-
70. Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1791-92, 104 L. Ed. 2d at 289.
71. Id. at 1792, 104 L. Ed. 2d at 289.
72. Id. at 1792-93, 104 L. Ed. 2d at 289-90. The Court stated that it generally reserves
exceptions to the lower standard of proof for cases in which the government attempts coercive
action, such as the termination of parental rights, involuntary commitment, and deportation.
Id. (citations omitted). In addition, the Court noted that the Mt. Healthy and Transportation
Management cases, which closely resembled Price Waterhouse, both applied the lower stan-
dard of proof. Id. See Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287
(1987); NLRB v Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 400 (1983). The Court
concluded:
We are not inclined to say that the public policy against firing employees be-
cause they spoke out on issues of public concern or because they affiliated with a
union is less important than the policy against discharging employees on the
basis of their gender. Each of these policies is vitally important, and each is
adequately served by requiring proof by a preponderance of the evidence.
Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1793, 104 L. Ed. 2d at 290.
73. Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1793, 104 L. Ed. 2d at 291.
74. Id. at 1795, 104 L. Ed. 2d at 293-94. Although Justice White did not provide a defini-
tion of substantial factor, the plurality defined motivating factor:
In saying that gender played a motivating part in an employment decision, we
mean that, if we asked the employer at the moment of the decision what its
reasons were and if we received a truthful response, one of those reasons would
be that the applicant or employee was a woman.
Id. at 1790, 104 L. Ed. 2d at 287-88.
75. Id. at 1796, 104 L. Ed. 2d at 294-95.
76. Id. The plurality found this suggestion puzzling because at that stage of the trial, the
court already would have found that an illegitimate motive played a part in the employment
decision. Id. at 1791 n.14, 104 L. Ed. 2d at 289 n.14.
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ployer created confusion concerning its motive in an employment decision
by consciously giving substantial weight to a prohibited factor.7 7 She justi-
fied the departure from the McDonnell Douglas and Burdine burden of proof
framework on two grounds. First, O'Connor noted that in McDonnell
Douglas, the plaintiff's prima facie case presented only inferential proof that
the employer relied on an impermissible factor in making an adverse em-
ployment decision.78 Therefore, the plaintiff only had a burden of produc-
tion.79  When direct evidence exists, however, that the employer
substantially relied on factors forbidden by Title VII, Justice O'Connor
would not entitle the employer to the same presumption of good faith.8 0
Second, Justice O'Connor contended that the new evidentiary standard she
proposed was necessary to fulfill the goal of McDonnell Douglas that Title
VII prohibit all discrimination. 8 1 Once a plaintiff has shown that an imper-
missible factor substantially motivated an employer's decision, O'Connor
did not think that the Court should penalize plaintiffs under Title VII by
requiring them to identify the precise cause of the adverse treatment.8 2
In addition, O'Connor contended that a substantive violation of Title VII
occurs only when an impermissible motive is the but for cause of an adverse
employment decision.8 3 Like White, she would also require a plaintiff to
show that sex played a substantial role in the decision.8 4 She noted, how-
ever, that when a plaintiff proves that an impermissible motive was a sub-
stantial factor, "a reasonable factfinder could conclude that absent further
explanation, the employer's discriminatory motive 'caused' the employment
decision. '8 -
D. Kennedy's Dissent
Justice Kennedy argued in dissent that regardless of who bears the burden
of proof, Title VII requires a finding that an impermissible motive is the but
77. Id. at 1796, 104 L. Ed. 2d at 295.
78. Id. at 1801, 104 L. Ed. 2d at 300-01.
79. Id.
80. Id. Justice O'Connor noted:
[T]he entire purpose of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case is to compen-
sate for the fact that direct evidence of intentional discrimination is hard to
come by. That the employer's burden in rebutting such an inferential case of
discrimination is only one of production does not mean that the scales should be
weighted in the same manner where there is direct evidence of intentional
discrimination.
Id. at 1801-02, 104 L. Ed. 2d at 301 (emphasis in original).
81. Id., 104 L. Ed. 2d at 301-02.
82. Id. at 1802-03, 104 L. Ed. at 301-03. Justice O'Connor observed:
Particularly in the context of the professional world, where decisions are often
made by collegial bodies on the basis of largely subjective criteria, requiring the
plaintiff [employee] to prove that any one factor was the definitive cause of the
decisionmakers' action may be tantamount to declaring Title VII inapplicable to
such decisions.
Id. at 1803, 104 L. Ed. 2d at 303 (emphasis in original).
83. Id. at 1797, 104 L. Ed. 2d at 295.




for cause of an adverse employment decision. 86 According to Kennedy, be-
cause the district court did not find that the Policy Board would have elected
Hopkins to the partnership absent impermissible, gender-based motives,
Hopkins failed to prove but for causation. 87 Consequently, he concluded
that the Court should render judgement for Price Waterhouse.8 8
Justice Kennedy also argued that McDonnell Douglas and Burdine pro-
vide the appropriate order of proof for all individual disparate treatment
cases under Title VII.89 He maintained that the Burdine framework specifi-
cally allowed the plaintiff to prove its case either by direct proof of discrimi-
natory motive or by indirect proof that the employer's justification was a
pretext.9 0 Justice Kennedy thus asserted that the Court should continue to
apply the Burdine framework to govern the order of proof in Title VII dispa-
rate treatment cases. 9 1
III. CONCLUSION
In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins9 2 the Supreme Court clarified the applica-
ble burdens of proof for a mixed-motive discrimination case under Title VII.
The Court based its findings on the twin aims of Title VII to protect an
employee from discriminatory employment decisions, while preserving an
employer's freedom to make decisions on other grounds. Although a major-
ity of the Court agreed that the defendant has the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that the same employment decision would
have occurred in the absence of a discriminatory motive, the Court split on
the requirement for showing but for causation. The plurality found no ambi-
guity, however, in the statute or its legislative history, firmly holding that
Title VII condemns even those decisions based on a mixture of legitimate
and illegitimate motives.
By applying the Mt. Healthy standard in Price Waterhouse, the Court ex-
panded the ways in which a plaintiff can challenge employment discrimina-
tion under Title VII--disparate impact, disparate treatment, and now mixed
motives. The Court, in rejecting the Burdine formula, demonstrated that
mixed-motive cases are distinct from pretext cases, even though the issue of
a legitimate business reason may arise in both. In the Court's view, the in-
troduction of direct evidence of discriminatory motive in an employment
decision warrants a shifting of the burden of proof to the employer. If the
employer, however, proves by a preponderance of the evidence that a legiti-
86. Id. at 1807, 104 L. Ed. 2d at 307. Justice Kennedy described the plurality's holding
on causation not as a rule requiring the plaintiff to prove the presence of causation but as a rule
requiring the defendant to prove its absence. Id. at 1809, 104 L. Ed. 2d at 311. Kennedy
maintained that this approach will cause confusion in the lower courts because it in theory
rejects but for causation for liability under Title VII but in practice adopts the standard when
the burden of proof shifts to the employer. Id. at 1807, 104 L. Ed. 2d at 307.
87. Id. at 1814, 104 L. Ed. 2d at 317.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1809, 104 L. Ed. 2d at 311.
90. Id. at 1810, 104 L. Ed. 2d at 311-12.
91. Id. at 1813, 104 L. Ed. 2d at 315.
92. 109 S. Ct. 1775, 104 L. Ed. 2d 268 (1989).
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mate reason by itself caused the employment decision, the dual nature of
Title VII insulates the employer from liability. The Court found this result
necessary to protect both the employee's rights and the employer's preroga-
tives under Title VII.
Sherry L. Evans

